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1. INTRODUCTION
While significant work in argumentation theory (and philosophy of argument) has
been devoted to the presentation of arguments, many now argue for renewed
attention to responses to arguments, and, in particular, to the epistemic
responsibilities of responders who clearly also play a central role in the successes or
failures of argumentation. As Kathryn Norlock notes, this renewed attention is
motivated, among other things, by concerns about the ancillary adversarial “blood
sport” practices of argumentation that are not unknown in philosophy and in other
contexts of debate. Since practices of argumentation are significantly communal and
relational, Norlock adds, we need to assess these practices as also ethical ones. More
particularly, she argues that we can usefully mine insights from an ethic of caring
(as advanced by Nell Noddings especially), and she endorses Noddings’s account of
receptivity (“the precondition for ethical interaction”) as a virtue that practitioners
of argumentation might usefully exhibit. My comments will focus on two central
topics: the ambivalent use of “caring” as central to the ethical picture Norlock sets
out, and the relationship between the epistemic and the ethical in argumentation as
suggested by her account.
2. PROBLEMS WITH “CARING”
Norlock does not overlook the fact that there has been some controversy about “an
ethics of care/caring,” as that has been proposed as a model for a feminist ethics,
particularly when it problematically draws on stereotypes of femininity. Caring can,
Norlock notes, “evoke associations with sentimental emotions, femininity, and
inarticulate feelings of affection”--clearly something not associated with rigorous
logic and argumentation. She draws attention to relationality as the key feature of an
ethic of care that she wants to emphasize--particularly as it applies to argument
situations, where discussants are understood to be in a dyadic relationship of
reciprocal receptivity which is, in Noddings’s words, “not necessarily an emotional
mode.” But the “caring” background is still somewhat problematic. I think it is
evoked by Norlock’s interlocutor who objects, “But I can go to a conference session
without any interest in the other’s well-being.” Norlock responds that some aspects
of morally caring about a speaker may not be relevant here, and I would like to see
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more about which specific aspects of caring Norlock sees as relevant. Relationships,
including caring relationships, can take many forms. Caring about the well-being of
another in a close familial relationship is quite different from the caring relationship
a physician might have with her patient, where the patient’s physical health or wellbeing is paramount. Insofar as caring and receptivity are appropriate in the
relationship between a presenter and responder (or arguer and receiver, in
Norlock’s wording) in an argument exchange, they are surely quite different still.
There is a relationship to a third element that both discussants have that makes the
argument situation quite different, I maintain. Norlock hints at this when she talks
about “the relationship between arguer and receiver, and the relationships of both
to the wider philosophical community that provides the opportunities for
argumentation.” I want to expand upon this by inserting the epistemic dimension
which, to my mind, significantly determines the specific contours (perhaps even
“caring” contours) of the application of ethical considerations.
3. THE ETHICAL AND THE EPISTEMIC
Norlock suggests that the virtue of receptivity in argument situations (as it is linked
with charitability) is “not just an intellectual virtue, but a moral one.” However, she
pays much more attention to the moral aspects in this paper, downplaying the
intellectual ones. I want to expand on Norlock’s account of the virtue of receptivity
in two ways: first, I suggest that we understand it as a hybrid virtue, an epistemicethical one, and second, that we see this virtue as grounded in a triadic relationship
between presenter, responder, and the epistemic goal of the exchange in question-typically truth or better understanding. Insofar as the two interlocutors have
epistemic-ethical responsibilities to each other (and I think they do), those
responsibilities are significantly framed by the third element in the relationship.
In a recent 2012 paper on adversarial argumentation in philosophy (one that
Norlock refers to) I argue that we not overlook the epistemic responsibilities of
responders (as well as presenters) in an argument exchange. More particularly, I
maintain that “[the responder’s] responsibilities to attend carefully to [the
presenter’s] argument and not misrepresent it need to be further delineated in
accord with the overarching responsibility to present appropriate and reasonable
responses that serve the overall goal of advancing truth or understanding in matters
related to the [topic at hand].” (Rooney, 2012, p. 321) How these responsibilities are
implemented in a given situation depends on the specific topic of the argument, the
context of argumentation, and, in some cases, on who the arguers are: in particular,
who they are as differentially located social agents when the argument at hand is
likely to draw on the different class, gender, or race experiences and knowledge of
the interlocutors. Part of my argument in that paper relies on recent work on
epistemic injustice, work that draws attention to problematic credibility deficits
related to social prejudices that responders may exhibit in testimonial and
argumentative exchanges. In her work on epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker
proposes the development of “epistemic justice” as (what she calls) a hybrid
intellectual-ethical virtue that helps to counter instances of epistemic injustice

2

PHYLLIS ROONEY
which she understands as “a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as
a knower.” (Fricker, 2007, p. 1)
How might this work relate to Norlock’s emphasis with receptivity in
argumentation, particularly insofar as receptivity recommends that we care about
persons and not just their ideas? She resists (though ambivalently) my suggestion in
another (2010) paper that we refrain--in argument situations--from wording such
as “You are wrong,” when “I disagree with your view” seems more appropriate. She
links my suggestion to what she sees as a tendency in philosophy to treat arguments
as separable from their authors. Sometimes, Norlock continues, that separation may
be appropriate (with hypothetical arguments, for example), but sometimes not. I am
unclear that the link to my suggestion stands, since I think that wording such as
“You are wrong” --particularly in adversarial argumentative situations-- exhibits
something less than the type of caring for someone in their capacity as a knower that
I assume Norlock intends, especially if it involves (in her words) “reducing
[someone’s] personhood to that of an opponent.”
Norlock maintains that it is sometimes important that we (as responders)
“scrutinize the author [of an argument], her reasons, her position in the world as she
formulates it, and her goals in entering a philosophical community to engage in
argumentation.” I entirely agree, though I would caution that articulating this
important recommendation within Nodding’s account of caring (and the
controversial associations this concept has evoked) may have the effect of drawing
attention away from the specific cognitive and epistemic experiences and capacities
that one should attend to in interacting with the arguer as a full epistemic as well as
moral agent. I am thus interested in hearing more about how Noddings’s and
Norlock’s understanding of receptivity as a virtue of argumentation might be further
fleshed out as a distinctly epistemic-ethical virtue.
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